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Consideration of effective measures to enhance the protection, security and safety of diplomatic and consular missions and representatives

Consideration of effective measures to enhance the protection, security and safety of diplomatic and consular missions and representatives

Report of the Secretary-General

Summary

Fifteen States submitted reports, pursuant to paragraph 10 of General Assembly resolution 65/30, by the established deadline (see section II of the present report).

Nine views were received from States pursuant to paragraph 12 of General Assembly resolution 65/30 (see section III).

Five additional States became participants to the instruments relevant to the protection, security and safety of diplomatic and consular missions and representatives (see section IV), since the previous report (A/65/112) on the topic.

* A/67/50.

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I. Introduction

1. On 6 December 2010, the General Assembly adopted resolution 65/30, entitled "Consideration of effective measures to enhance the protection, security and safety of diplomatic and consular missions and representatives". Paragraphs 10, 12 and 13 of the resolution read as follows:

> *The General Assembly*,
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> ...
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> 10. *Urges*:
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> (*a*) All States to report to the Secretary-General, in a concise and expeditious manner and in accordance with the guidelines prepared by the Secretary-General, serious violations of the protection, security and safety of diplomatic and consular missions and representatives as well as missions and representatives with diplomatic status to international intergovernmental organizations;
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> (*b*) The State in which the violation took place — and, to the extent possible, the State where the alleged offender is present — to report to the Secretary-General, in a concise and expeditious manner and in accordance with the guidelines prepared by the Secretary-General, on measures taken to bring the offender to justice and eventually to communicate, in accordance with its laws, the final outcome of the proceedings against the offender, and to report on measures adopted with a view to preventing a repetition of such violations;
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> ...
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> 12. *Also requests* the Secretary-General to invite States, in the circular note referred to in paragraph 11 (a) above, to inform him of their views with respect to any measures needed or already taken to enhance the protection, security and safety of diplomatic and consular missions and representatives as well as missions and representatives with diplomatic status to international intergovernmental organizations;
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> 13. *Further requests* the Secretary-General to submit to the General Assembly at its sixty-seventh session a report containing:
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> (*a*) Information on the state of ratification of and accessions to the instruments referred to in paragraph 8 above;
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> (*b*) A summary of the reports received and views expressed pursuant to paragraphs 10 and 12 above;

2. By notes dated 12 January 2011 and 29 March 2012, the Secretary-General drew the attention of States to the request contained in paragraph 10 (a) of resolution 65/30 and invited them to report to the Secretary-General serious violations of the protection, security and safety of diplomatic and consular missions and representatives.

3. The present report has been prepared pursuant to paragraph 13 of resolution 65/30.

4. Section II of the report contains a summary of the reports received and the text of those reports relevant to paragraph 10 of the resolution.

5. Section III of the report contains the views expressed pursuant to paragraph 12 of the resolution.

6. Section IV of the report contains information on the status of participation of States, as at 11 June 2012, in the Vienna Convention on Diplomatic Relations of 1961,[1] the Vienna Convention on Consular Relations of 1963,[2] and the respective optional protocols thereto, as well as the 1973 Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of Crimes against Internationally Protected Persons, including Diplomatic Agents.[3]

II. Reports received from States pursuant to paragraph 10 of General Assembly resolution 65/30

7. **The former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia** (4 October 2010) referred to the report submitted by Greece on 10 July 2010 (see A/65/112, para. 18) and further reported as follows:

The Republic of Macedonia provides protection to the Liaison Office of the Hellenic Republic in the Republic of Macedonia and its representatives in accordance with the relevant provisions of the respective Vienna Conventions. In particular, the premises of the Liaison Office are guarded on a permanent 24-hour basis by Macedonian security personnel. When warranted by the circumstances, the Republic of Macedonia acts to put in place enhanced security measures, including the deployment of supplemental security personnel. In particular, the Republic of Macedonia responds promptly and efficiently to relevant requests put forward by the Liaison Office in Skopje for enhanced security measures in case of demonstrations taking place at the premises. If any report is received of alleged criminal activity against the staff or property of the Liaison Office, the competent Macedonian authorities immediately investigate the matter. Where wrongdoers are identified, they are dealt with according to the law.

...

As regards the asserted theft of licence plates from, or vandalism to, vehicles belonging to personnel of the Liaison Office of the Hellenic Republic in Skopje:

The Interior Ministry conducted investigations into two allegations of theft of licence plates from vehicles belonging to a member of the Greek diplomatic staff and to the spouse of a member of the Greek diplomatic staff on 14 January and 24 March 2008, respectively. In neither instance was the police investigation able to determine the person responsible for the theft; however, in both cases the Interior Ministry issued new licence plates without delay. It should be noted that neither incident took place outside the Liaison Office, which is guarded on a 24-hour basis, and where Macedonian police are in a position to monitor vehicles belonging to Greek diplomatic staff.

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[1] United Nations, *Treaty Series*, vol. 500, No. 7310.

[2] Ibid., vol. 596, No. 8638.

[3] Ibid., vol. 1035, No. 15410.

Investigations were conducted by the Interior Ministry into allegations of vandalism to vehicle licence plates and vehicles belonging to diplomatic and administrative staff of the Liaison Office, and to one of their spouses on 29 February, 3 April, 15 May, 20 June and 7 July 2008. In no case was the police able to identify the perpetrator. It is not alleged that the incidents of 29 February or 3 April took place outside the Liaison Office, where the 24-hour police security presence would have been in a position to monitor the vehicles in question. With respect to the 15 May incident, the police investigation uncovered information suggesting that the scratches to the vehicle in question were observed on it prior to the date on which the incident reportedly occurred, suggesting that the damage had not in fact been occasioned while the vehicle was parked outside the Liaison Office. With respect to the 20 June incident, doubts were also raised as to whether the alleged damage took place outside the Liaison Office, owing to the extremely short period of time during which the vehicle was stationed outside the premises.

With respect to the allegation made by the Permanent Representative of the Hellenic Republic of vandalism to the vehicle of a member of the Greek diplomatic staff on 30 May 2008, no such incident was reported to the Macedonian authorities at the time, and consequently no police investigation was — or could have been — undertaken.

With regard to the reported criminal activity against the residences of personnel of the Liaison Office of the Hellenic Republic in Skopje:

The Interior Ministry conducted an investigation into the allegation that a piece of wood was thrown at a window of the personal residence of the Head of the Liaison Office on 21 April 2008. The police investigations were unable to identify the perpetrator.

The Interior Ministry investigated a reported burglary at the residence of a First Counsellor of the Liaison Office on 26 April 2008, resulting in the theft of a number of items of minor value. Despite questioning by the police of those living in neighbouring properties, the Macedonian authorities were unable to identify the perpetrator. There is no evidence to support the allegation made by the Hellenic Republic that the burglary was intended to intimidate or threaten Greek diplomatic staff.

The Permanent Mission of the Hellenic Republic to the United Nations now asserts that a further incident took place at the same residence on 18 June 2008, during which unidentified persons uprooted plants and threw mud on a vehicle in the courtyard of the residence. The Government of Macedonia has found no information that this incident was reported to the police at the time.

With regard to allegations concerning public demonstrations outside the Liaison Office of the Hellenic Republic in Skopje:

The Interior Ministry deployed additional police security forces and enhanced security measures to protect the Liaison Office during the course of a public demonstration outside the premises which took place on 19 February 2008. Despite those measures, regrettably, two windows of the Liaison Office were broken by objects thrown during the course of the demonstration, and a number of vehicles parked outside the Liaison Office were also damaged. The police conducted an investigation into the incident, as a result of which the organizer of the protest was charged with a misdemeanour for failing properly to control the demonstration.

Additional security forces were subsequently deployed to the Liaison Office on 20 and 21 February 2008 in anticipation of further possible demonstrations. However, no such demonstrations in fact took place.

The Interior Ministry investigated complaints made by the Liaison Office concerning the heckling of Macedonian citizens queuing outside the Liaison Office on 27 June 2008. The Interior Ministry determined that this had occurred during the course of a public protest outside the Liaison Office, and that none of the Macedonian citizens in question had been harmed in any way and no further problems had been reported.

8. The **Kyrgyz Republic** (22 February 2011) referred to the report submitted by Belarus on 17 June 2010 (see A/65/112/Add.1, para. 7) and further reported as follows:

During 2010 there were several peaceful pickets outside the building of the Embassy of the Republic of Belarus in the Kyrgyz Republic. The pickets were organized mainly by the relatives of those killed during the events of 7 April 2010 in the Kyrgyz Republic. No incident was recorded between the Embassy staff and picketers.

The competent authorities of the Kyrgyz Republic held a meeting with the Ambassador Extraordinary and Plenipotentiary of the Republic of Belarus to the Kyrgyz Republic, V. Denisenko, in order to ensure the safety of the Embassy and its assets. Several issues regarding the possible threats to the diplomatic mission and the security of its staff were discussed as well. Following that meeting, measures were strengthened to protect the Belarusian Embassy and the residences of its staff. There were 225 policemen involved in these activities. The staff of the Embassy was provided by direct phone numbers of law enforcement officials of Kyrgyzstan for emergency communication.

The law enforcement officials of Kyrgyzstan did not receive any comments or complaints from Ambassador Denisenko and the staff of the Embassy while ensuring public order, and the security and safety of the diplomatic mission.

Based on the above, the Permanent Mission of the Kyrgyz Republic to the United Nations does not consider those pickets outside the Belarusian diplomatic mission in Kyrgyzstan as serious violations of the protection, security and safety of diplomatic and consular missions and representatives set out in General Assembly resolution 65/30.

9. **Iraq** (5 April 2011) referred to the terrorist attacks against the premises of diplomatic missions and their staff in Iraq (2003, 2005-2007 and 2010):

Taking advantage of the weakness of the security services, which were being reorganized in 2003, 2005 and 2006, terrorists carried out closely spaced successive attacks.

Examples of those attacks include car bombings, the abduction of some ambassadors and the firing of shots at diplomatic motorcades in 2003, 2005-2007 and 2010.

The security forces of the Ministry of the Interior were restructured, with a view to creating a force that is suited to fulfilling its primary responsibility, namely,

protecting the premises of diplomatic missions and ensuring the safety of mission staff as they move outside their missions' premises.

After the overall restructuring of the security forces, including the police directorate responsible for the protection of diplomatic premises, had been completed, a number of measures were taken to enhance the protection, security and safety of diplomatic and consular missions and representatives. No security breaches have occurred and terrorists have not been allowed to threaten or attack the premises of any diplomatic mission or international organization in Baghdad.

A number of measures were taken to prevent the recurrence of such attacks, including addressing security deficiencies and intensifying the intelligence-gathering activities of the security services, in order to enhance the protection, security and safety of diplomatic and consular missions and representatives, and prevent the recurrence of such attacks.

Leaders of terrorist organizations were captured throughout Iraq, and significant progress has been made towards achieving security in most regions of the country.

Measures were taken to ensure that persons who attack the premises of diplomatic missions are brought to justice and given severe sentences, in accordance with the laws on countering terrorism and organized crime.

Terrorism is a global scourge and Iraq continues to do everything in its power to fulfil its counter-terrorism obligations. Iraq has suffered great loss of life and equipment in thwarting terrorist attacks and protecting Arab and foreign diplomatic missions and staff.

...

10. **The United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland** (9 May 2011) referred to the report submitted by the Democratic Republic of the Congo on 15 July 2010 (see A/65/112/Add.1, para. 8) and further reported as follows:

On Sunday, 6 June 2010, two diplomatic cars were set on fire in the driveway of the residence of the Ambassador of the Democratic Republic of the Congo to the United Kingdom. Both vehicles were destroyed. In addition, the front door of the Ambassador's residence was badly damaged by the fire. Evidence at the scene suggested that the fire was started deliberately and the police treated this as a case of arson. In the interests of his and his family's safety, the Ambassador was moved by the police to a hotel.

A search for forensic evidence was made at the scene of the crime. No forensic evidence was found at the scene to link the attack to any particular person. Despite an appeal for information by the police, no one has been charged with the crime. The investigation remains open.

In the immediate aftermath, a round-the-clock unarmed police guard was placed by the United Kingdom outside the Embassy of the Democratic Republic of the Congo. At the same time, an armed police response vehicle conducted visits every two hours to the hotel where the Ambassador and his family were staying. In addition, the police subsequently installed a panic alarm and temporary CCTV (closed-circuit television) cameras at the residence.

The Ambassador moved to a new residence in July 2010. The diplomatic police carried out a security review. As a result of the review and on the advice of the diplomatic police, a CCTV system, a panic alarm with a direct link to the police and a fire retardant letter box were installed before the Ambassador and his family moved in. Regular visits every four hours by armed police officers continued at the new residence for some months after the Ambassador moved in. The Ambassador resides outside the diplomatic police zone but the local police are aware of his new address and make regular patrols.

11. **Austria** (13 May 2011) reported incidents involving the Austrian Embassy in Teheran, Islamic Republic of Iran (2010), and the Austrian Embassy's Commercial Section in Lagos, Nigeria (2010):

On 21 May 2010 the Austrian Ambassador to Iran hosted the yearly International Charity Bazaar of the Diplomatic Ladies Group on the premises of his residence in Teheran. Police barriers at the gates of the residence and in its vicinity prevented almost all Iranian nationals from entering the premise. Police personnel at the entrance were armed with guns and clubs and the entrance was under video surveillance. Two members of the police force entered the property without being invited to do so. The incident was brought to the attention of the Foreign Ministry of the Islamic Republic of Iran by note verbale dated 23 May 2010. The Islamic Republic of Iran informed the Austrian Embassy in Teheran that investigations into the incident, in particular regarding the unauthorized presence of police personnel on the premises of the residence, would be carried out. To date, the Austrian Embassy was — contrary to promises made earlier — not informed about the outcome of these investigations.

On 10 August 2010, the Austrian Embassy in Teheran hosted a jazz concert on Embassy premises. Three plainclothes policemen and five in uniform of the diplomatic police blocked the entrance to the Embassy using their police vehicles and prevented a number of invited guests from entering the premises. Iranian nationals were threatened with arrest. Upon intervention by the Austrian Ambassador, all guests were allowed to leave the Embassy unharmed after the concert. The incident was brought to the attention of the Foreign Ministry of the Islamic Republic of Iran by note verbale.

On 28 December 2010 four armed assailants forcibly entered the premises of the Austrian Embassy's Commercial Section in Lagos and attacked the Head of the Commercial Section, his spouse and his sister. During the one-hour-long occupation of the Embassy premises, the assailants subjected their victims to threats, intimidation, and physical abuse and inflicted particularly serious harm to the spouse of the Head of the Commercial Section. Valuables as well as a considerably large amount of funds denominated in various currencies were stolen. The incident was brought to the attention of the Foreign Ministry of the Federal Republic of Nigeria, by note verbale dated 28 December 2010. On 24 January 2011 the Austrian Embassy in Abuja was informed by the Lagos State Police Commissioner that five persons had been arrested and that the suspects had confessed. So far no charges have been filed against any of the five suspects. According to the police, three more individuals are still at large. The Nigerian authorities also informed the Austrian Embassy on 24 January 2011 that they had been able to recover some of the stolen items and valuables but they later retracted that statement. To date, the Nigerian

authorities have failed to hand over any recovered items or valuables to the Embassy.

12. **Qatar** (31 May 2011) reported an incident involving the Embassy of the State of Qatar and the official Ambassador's residence in Tripoli, Libya (1 May 2011):

The Embassy of the State of Qatar and the official Ambassador's residence in Tripoli were looted and set ablaze in a targeted attack on 1 May 2011. The State of Qatar strongly condemns and denounces this attack as a flagrant violation of international law and norms, especially the Vienna Convention on Diplomatic Relations, which stipulates that the host country must provide full protection to accredited diplomatic missions and guard them against all sorts of attacks. The State of Qatar stresses that it holds Libyan authorities fully responsible for this attack and all damages arising therefrom.

13. **Belgium** (20 June 2011) reported the carjacking of the Ambassador of Belgium in Ouagadougou, Burkina Faso, and submitted a table summarizing the burglaries/thefts/break-ins that occurred in Belgium in 2010 at diplomatic missions and consular offices of, inter alia, Afghanistan, Bhutan, the Gambia, Iceland, Lesotho, Qatar, Saudi Arabia, Sweden, Venezuela (Bolivarian Republic of) and the League of Arab States, and setting out the measures taken by Belgium to ensure the security and safety of such offices in its territory:

With regard to incidents involving Belgian diplomatic offices abroad, the Belgian authorities would refer to the recent carjacking of the Ambassador of Belgium in Ouagadougou. This incident is being followed closely by the Belgian security services.

2010: harmful acts targeting foreign diplomatic missions, as reported to the Department of Protocol for Foreign Affairs

Country	*Institution*	*Harmful act*	*Date*
Afghanistan	Embassy	Embassy burglary	3/10/2010
Bhutan	Embassy	Theft of national flag	19/1/2010
Bhutan	Embassy	Theft of national flag	8/11/2010
Gambia	Embassy	Embassy burglary	16/4/2010
Iceland	Embassy	Attempted break-in of embassy premises	10/7/2010
League of Arab States	Organization	Mission burglary	24/1/2010
League of Arab States	Organization	Attempted break-in of mission premises	14/4/2010
Lesotho	Embassy	Embassy burglary	28/1/2010
Qatar	Embassy	Embassy burglary	22/3/2010

Country	*Institution*	*Harmful act*	*Date*
Saudi Arabia	Embassy	Attempted break-in of embassy premises	23/1/2010
Sweden	Embassy	Embassy burglary	17/1/2010
Venezuela (Bolivarian Republic of)	Embassy	Attempted burglary of diplomatic building (military offices)	25/1/2010

Specific measures

A diplomatic mission with a security issue reports it to the Department of Protocol for Foreign Affairs. The Department then reports it to the relevant security agency, which provides the appropriate response. For example, in 2010, meetings chaired by Belgian law enforcement agencies were held for a number of diplomatic missions that had been the victims of burglaries/theft/violence, in order to provide them with information on preventive measures and to address their concerns. Additional meetings have been held with diplomatic missions outside Belgium that have been the victims of parcel bombs in order to train them to recognize suspicious parcels and to inform them of the procedures to follow if a suspicious parcel is received.

14. **Greece** (29 July 2011) reported incidents involving the Greek Diplomatic and Consular Mission and representatives in the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia (10 February and 25, 30 and 31 May; 9 and 10 September 2008; and 29 May and 10 October 2009):

On 10 February 2008, at 0620 hours, a group of young men threw empty bottles and stones against the parking space area reserved for the vehicles of the Liaison Office of the Hellenic Republic. As a result of this attack, the vehicles of two staff members of the Liaison Office were seriously damaged. The local police, which was notified by the police security guard on duty, recorded the incident and managed to identify some of the culprits, who appeared to be underage. A note verbale was sent to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, in Skopje, on 11 February 2008, while the Head of the Liaison Office met with the Director of Protocol on 13 February 2008, regarding this incident.

On 25 May 2008, at approximately 1830 hours, a Greek Police officer was driving his vehicle (Greek licence plates NEP 2635) on the highway connecting the Greek border with Skopje, returning from Greece to report for duty at the Liaison Office. When, due to increased traffic, all vehicles had to come to a halt, the officer and his vehicle were physically attacked by five unknown persons who were travelling in adjacent vehicles and were part of a larger group travelling to Skopje to participate at a political rally later the same day. Further attacks by this group were averted only because the attackers realized the presence of a close-by police vehicle. A note verbale regarding this incident was sent to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs in Skopje.

In the first morning hours of 30 May 2008, unknown perpetrators destroyed the external rear-view mirror of a vehicle belonging to a member of the diplomatic staff of the Liaison Office (licence plates No. 27-CD-49). The incident took place in

front of the staff member's residence on 13 Kozle Street. This incident was reported to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs in Skopje, in a note verbale.

In the first morning hours of 31 May 2008, unknown perpetrators threw eggs against the coat of arms of Greece at the residence of the Head of the Liaison Office. This incident was reported to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs in Skopje, in a note verbale.

On 9 September 2008, a vehicle, make Audi 80 (Greek licence plates KNA-8503), belonging to a member of the diplomatic staff of the Liaison Office, was vandalized by two unidentified perpetrators, who damaged the rear number plate. It should be noted that the culprits managed to flee the scene of the crime, despite the fact that the vehicle in question was parked in the parking area reserved for the Liaison Office, which is located right next to the police security guard's booth. Furthermore, on 10 September 2008, unidentified person(s) removed the engraved inscription from the facade of the Greek Press Office, located at 54, Kliment Ohridski Street. A note verbale was sent at the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, in Skopje, on 11 September 2008.

In the morning hours of 29 May 2009, unknown perpetrators threw stones against the residence of the Head of the Liaison Office, located at 3 Ankarska Street, in Skopje. The perpetrators probably used the courtyard of the adjacent public school for this purpose. The police were notified immediately and arrived on the spot to record the incident. A note verbale was also sent to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, in Skopje, on 1 June 2009.

At approximately 2100 hours on 29 May 2009, a vehicle, make Mercedes (licence plates No. 27-S-015), belonging to a member of the diplomatic staff of the Liaison Office, parked at the parking area in front of the premises of the Liaison Office, was vandalized by two unidentified perpetrators, who damaged the windshield, the trunk and the right side of the vehicle. The two perpetrators threw a car mirror in the courtyard of the Liaison Office and managed to flee the scene, since the on-duty police security guard of the Liaison Office was absent. The incident was reported to the Foreign Ministry in Skopje via note verbale on 2 June 2009.

In the early morning of 10 October 2009, unknown perpetrators smashed the right window of a vehicle belonging to a member of the diplomatic staff of the Liaison Office (licence plates No. 27-CD-016). As there were no items or personal belongings missing from the vehicle, the motive of this attack does not seem to be theft. The perpetrators managed to flee the scene of the crime, despite the fact that the vehicle in question was parked near the Liaison Office. A note verbale concerning this incident was sent to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, in Skopje, on 12 October 2009.

15. **Burkina Faso** (28 October 2011) referred to the report submitted by Belgium on 20 June 2011 (see para. 13 above) and further reported as follows:

During the months of February to June 2011, Burkina Faso experienced a serious social and political crisis. In particular, a number of demonstrations by civilians and soldiers in several of the country's cities caused not only considerable material damage and loss of life but also concern among Burkina Faso's partners.

It was in this difficult context that the official vehicle of the Ambassador of the Kingdom of Belgium was seized on the afternoon of 14 April 2011, as the Ambassador returned home, by soldiers who had mutinied.

As soon as it was notified of the theft, the Government took the necessary measures and the vehicle was found and returned to the Embassy.

The Embassy also applied to the Government for compensation to cover the costs it had incurred in repairing the vehicle. That application is currently being processed.

In the light of this situation and in order to prevent this kind of incident from occurring in the future, the Government has taken the following measures:

- Dismissal from the national army of the 566 soldiers who mutinied
- Establishment of a security mechanism for the special protection of diplomatic and consular missions and offices accredited to Burkina Faso, as well as persons enjoying diplomatic status.

16. **The Islamic Republic of Iran** (30 November 2011) reported an incident involving the premises of the Embassy of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland in Tehran (29 November 2011):

On Tuesday, 29 November 2011, at approximately 2 p.m., a group of about 400 students gathered in front of the Embassy of the United Kingdom in Tehran in a peaceful protest against the British Government's policies vis-à-vis the Iranian nation. At about 4 p.m., the protest went out of control after a few protesters tried to break the security line and enter the premises. Despite all preventive measures taken by the police, unfortunately a group of protesters stormed the premises of the Embassy and caused damage to the building and properties therein. The premises was evacuated later with the deployment of additional anti-riot police forces and after direct involvement of the highest-ranking police officials, including the Chief Commander of the Islamic Republic of Iran Law Enforcement Forces (Police) and Tehran's Police Chief.

At approximately the same time, a group of 60 to 70 individuals gathered outside the United Kingdom Embassy's residential compound in Tehran. A number of protesters entered the compound after a fierce clash with the security guards and caused damage to the property.

The Islamic Republic of Iran expresses its regret regarding these incidents and reaffirms its full commitment under relevant international instruments to take all appropriate measures to protect the premises of diplomatic missions against intrusion or damage and to prevent any attack on the person of the staff members of the missions. Measures have already been taken by the judicial authorities to thoroughly investigate the incidents and identify the culprits.

17. **The United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland** (23 February 2012) referred to the report submitted by the Islamic Republic of Iran (30 November 2011) concerning the incident involving the premises of the Embassy of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland in Tehran (29 November 2011) (see para. 16 above), submitted photographs demonstrating the damage done to the Embassy and the private property and further reported as follows:

The United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland welcomes the expressions of regret, and reiteration of Iran's full commitment to take all appropriate measures to protect diplomatic premises and staff, conveyed in the note from the Islamic Republic of Iran, but nevertheless considers it to be an inadequate explanation of the events of 29 November 2011. In response to the note from the Islamic of Republic of Iran, the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland wishes to provide the following corrections and clarifications, and requests that this note be circulated to all Members of the United Nations.

The note from the Islamic Republic of Iran claims that protesters gathered in front of the United Kingdom Embassy in a "peaceful protest". On the contrary, it was clear from its outset that the demonstration was not peaceful. Incendiary devices and rocks were thrown at the premises, and the crowd chanted "Death to the English". The event was preceded by numerous inflammatory and inaccurate statements by senior Iranian politicians, including unfounded allegations of nefarious activity by the United Kingdom Embassy, which were given full coverage by the Iranian State media. Attempts by the United Kingdom Embassy to rebut these allegations were ignored.

The note from the Islamic Republic of Iran claims that "despite all preventive measures taken by the police, unfortunately a group of protesters stormed the premises". This is inaccurate. There was a small police presence in comparison with previous demonstrations, despite United Kingdom Embassy requests to the Iranian authorities to ensure adequate protection following a series of telephone threats. Those police who were there appeared to do very little to discourage the demonstrators. This inadequate policing response meant that the demonstrators were able to enter the premises easily. This is all confirmed by footage of the event.

The note from the Islamic Republic of Iran states that "The premises was evacuated later on with the deployment of additional anti-riot police forces". In total, the attack on the main United Kingdom Embassy compound lasted about six hours. In a part of Tehran well within reach of numerous police stations, and despite the Embassy's frequent requests for police reinforcements during the attack, no such reinforcements arrived for about five hours after the initial breach occurred. This allowed several waves of rioters to gain access to the premises, and to loot and destroy United Kingdom Embassy and personal property. The Embassy building was set on fire while diplomats were still inside it. Some police officers were also observed entering homes and removing items. When it was clear that the compound was empty of rioters, United Kingdom diplomats were forcibly prevented by police from leaving the area where they had taken refuge.

The note from the Islamic Republic of Iran states that "A number of protesters entered the [northern Residential] compound after a fierce clash with the security guards and caused damage to the property". Some 200 to 300 people coordinated to attack the Gulhak residential compound simultaneously with the attack on the main Embassy compound at Ferdowsi. There was no "clash" with either Embassy security guards or police. This group held United Kingdom diplomats captive for three hours, looted homes of personal possessions and valuables, stole computers and documents and destroyed other personal items. The police arrived after three hours. Every home, on both compounds, was looted and vandalized.

The note from the Islamic Republic of Iran states that "Measures have already been taken by the judicial authorities to thoroughly investigate the incidents and

identify the culprits". The United Kingdom welcomes this. The United Kingdom assumes these investigations are well in hand, looks forward to the presentation of the findings, taking the events as described above into account and invites the Islamic Republic of Iran to publish the findings of the report. The United Kingdom trusts that the report will also give a clear answer as to why many of the perpetrators of these attacks were members of the Basij, a State-affiliated militia.

18. **Slovenia** (9 May 2012) reported violations of the safety of diplomatic missions, consular posts and international organizations in the Republic of Slovenia in 2008, 2009, 2010 and 2011, as well as incidents involving the Permanent Representation of the Republic of Slovenia to the European Union in Brussels (Belgium) and the General Consulate of the Republic of Slovenia in Trieste (Italy):

In 2008, some cases of vandalism were recorded (graffiti, flag theft, damaged fence, etc.) at the embassies of the Hellenic Republic, the Slovak Republic, the Kingdom of Spain, the Republic of Cyprus, the Republic of Serbia and the Republic of Croatia. On 3 February 2008, unknown persons left, in front of the Embassy of the Republic of Bulgaria, three suitcases that allegedly contained dangerous or explosive substances. Police officers ascertained that the suitcases contained no dangerous substances.

In 2009 there were several cases of vandalism (graffiti, etc.) at the embassies of the Hellenic Republic, the Republic of Serbia, and Montenegro.

In 2010 there were several cases recorded of vandalism and damaged fences at the embassies of the Hellenic Republic, the Apostolic Nunciature of the Holy See, the Republic of Austria, the Republic of Croatia, and Montenegro.

In 2011, several cases of vandalism and criminal offences of damage to property were recorded at the embassies of the Hellenic Republic, the Slovak Republic, the Arab Republic of Egypt, the Italian Republic, the Kingdom of the Netherlands, Montenegro, and the Republic of Lithuania. Threats to the embassies of the United States of America, Austria, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Serbia, and Egypt should not be disregarded, although they proved to be false. Burglaries in the flats of German and Polish diplomats were also recorded. The embassies of the Hellenic Republic, the Kingdom of Spain and France received suspicious letters which, however, proved to be harmless.

The Slovenian police took measures in all the above cases in compliance with its competencies and authority and duly notified the relevant district State prosecution service on the basis of the Criminal Procedure Act.

The security situation in the Republic of Slovenia is currently favourable and represents no direct threat or increased security risk for diplomatic missions, consular posts and intergovernmental organizations.

The police follow the security situation in the Republic of Slovenia and, in the case of information or actions that might influence the security of protected facilities or diplomatic staff, will take adequate measures, in accordance with its capabilities, to provide adequate security for protected facilities and diplomatic staff.

The Republic of Slovenia also has the honour to communicate information concerning violations of the safety of diplomatic and consular missions of the Republic of Slovenia. In the last two years, criminal offences of damage to property

and diplomatic personnel (robbery, burglary and theft) were recorded at the Permanent Representation of the Republic of Slovenia to the European Union in Brussels, and at the General Consulate of the Republic of Slovenia in Trieste a threat to a member of diplomatic personnel was recorded. The Italian Republic took appropriate measures against the alleged offender.

19. **Sweden** (10 May 2012) reported incidents involving the protection, security and safety of diplomatic missions and representatives of the Islamic Republic of Iran, Iraq, Libya, Mexico, Saudi Arabia, the Syrian Arab Republic and Ukraine that had occurred in Sweden (2010-2011), as well as to a few minor violations of the protection, security and safety of diplomatic and consular missions and representatives in Sweden:

Iran

19 August 2011. The Embassy was attacked with Molotov cocktails. The investigation was closed owing to a lack of evidence.

Iraq

28/29 June 2011. The kitchen windowpane of a home in which an attaché to the Embassy and his family reside was broken in the middle of the night. Two hours later, two large stones were thrown at the same kitchen window causing the entire window to break. The investigation is still in progress.

Libya

11 March 2010. The Libyan Embassy was vandalized in the form of broken glass and glass doors after the perpetrator went berserk in the entrance. He was sentenced to one month in prison for the crime on 31 March 2010.

16 February 2011. The Swedish Police Service's Diplomatic Protection Service has reported that a person threw a stone at the Libyan Embassy, shattering a window unit in the entrance as well as a window in the office premises. The person was arrested by the police. However, an investigation on vandalism is under way.

21 April 2011. A few demonstrators trespassed on Embassy grounds. A flag was burned inside the premises and the door was painted the colours of the Libyan rebel flag. Six people were arrested for unlawful intrusion. Some damage might have been caused to the Embassy, the extent of which is still unknown. The investigation was closed owing to lack of evidence.

11 August 2011. The Embassy was stormed after seven people, who were later arrested for unlawful intrusion, broke into the Embassy. Prosecution has now been started against the perpetrators.

Mexico

3 August 2010. A diplomat at the Embassy had a burglary. The stolen property was worth about 540,000 Swedish krona. The criminal investigation was closed owing to a lack of trace evidence.

Saudi Arabia

9 January 2010. A perpetrator threw a Molotov cocktail at an Embassy window, causing one of the awnings to catch fire. There was damage to the face of the building; no one was injured. The investigation was closed owing to lack of evidence.

Syrian Arab Republic

The Embassy was threatened when an unknown perpetrator wrote in a letter dated 9 October 2011 that Syrian embassies and civil servants would be annihilated unless the genocide in Syria ceased. The letter writer also wrote that the threat extended to higher-ranking civil servants and ambassadors in other countries. The letter stipulated a nine-day time limit. Nothing happened. The investigation was closed owing to lack of evidence.

Ukraine

11 April 2011 a diplomat at the Embassy had a burglary and jewellery valued at 500,000 Swedish krona were stolen. The investigation was closed owing to lack of evidence.

A few minor violations of the protection, security and safety of diplomatic and consular missions and representatives in Sweden were also reported during this period. These incidents include low-level threats, petty thefts and burglaries, in particular of embassy shields or diplomatic plates belonging to official embassy or diplomatic vehicles, vandalism of diplomatic vehicles/embassy property and some cases of harassment of visitors to missions. There have also been a couple of cases involving various minor intrusions into embassy premises.

20. **Australia** (14 May 2012) reported an incident involving the Syrian Embassy in Canberra (4 February 2012):

On 4 February 2012, at approximately 2130 hours a number of men forced entry into the Syrian Embassy in Canberra. These demonstrators inflicted damage to the exterior and interior of the Embassy. Three staff members were present at the time of the incident; however, none of them was injured.

The incident is believed to have occurred in response to reports that more than 200 people were killed by Syrian forces in the city of Homs. The incident coincided with a number of other violent demonstrations at embassies in Europe and the Middle East.

Following this incident, a crime scene was established by the Australian Federal Police and additional measures were implemented for the protection of the Chargé d'affaires. The Australian Federal Police is liaising with other agencies to undertake a thorough investigation of the incident. The Permanent Mission of Australia to the United Nations will report to the Secretary-General the final outcome of any proceedings brought against the offenders.

Following the incident, on 5 February 2012 the then Foreign Minister, the Hon. Kevin Rudd, M.P., released the following statement regarding the incident:

The Government ... expresses its deep concern at the disturbance of the Syrian Embassy last night. The Government is fully mindful of its obligations under

the Vienna Convention and the proper protection of diplomatic consular personnel and property. The Australian Federal Police is investigating this incident. Such behaviour has no place in Australia.

No other events seriously violated the protection, security and safety of diplomatic and consular missions in Australia.

21. **Jordan** (1 March 2011) and **Finland** (15 May 2012) reported that there had been no violations on their respective territories during the reporting period.

III. Views expressed by States pursuant to paragraph 12 of General Assembly resolution 65/30

22. **Iraq** (5 April 2011) expressed the following views:

> ... Iraq still requires the cooperation of the international community, whether by providing information, engaging in security cooperation or providing Iraq with the advanced technical equipment, weapons, logistical support and training it needs to support its counter-terrorism efforts.

One of the primary reasons that such attacks have occurred is the non-compliance of diplomatic missions with the instructions and recommendations issued by the security forces and the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. Furthermore, diplomatic missions are not taking the measures required to prevent attacks.

Diplomatic premises are being used in a manner that is incompatible with their functions.

The Iraqi authorities stress the importance of General Assembly resolution 35/168, in which the Assembly recognized the important role that enhancing the protection, security and safety of diplomatic and consular missions and representatives plays in preserving high-level diplomatic relations between States and peoples. In that connection, the Republic of Iraq takes responsibility for the protection, security and safety of diplomatic and consular missions and representatives who are in Iraqi territory in an official capacity.

Practical measures have been taken to prevent in Iraq the illegal activities of persons, groups or entities that organize, instigate or encourage the perpetration of acts against the security and safety of diplomatic missions.

The Iraqi authorities emphasize that diplomatic and consular missions and representatives should comply fully with the guide provided by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. They must also prevent any abuse of diplomatic privileges and immunities, particularly abuses involving acts of violence.

The perpetrators of such crimes are pursued and thoroughly investigated and their crimes are made public after they have been brought to justice.

The authorities stress the importance of cooperation and coordination between the Iraqi security and intelligence services, on the one hand, and States having diplomatic representation in Iraq, on the other hand, with regard to security measures designed to enhance the protection, security and safety of diplomatic and consular missions, as well as with regard to exchange of information concerning serious violations that have occurred or are anticipated.

Diplomatic missions should provide the Ministry of Foreign Affairs with detailed information regarding the measures they take when the perpetrators of serious violations take refuge in their countries. They should also inform Iraq of any developments with regard to the aforementioned measures, as well as with regard to measures taken to prevent such violations.

23. **Panama** (29 April 2011) expressed the following views:

Important things to consider in the implementation of security

- Remaining in the same posts or activities makes you an easy target. You should frequently change any routine that puts you at risk
- Avoid disclosing certain types of personal information
- Keep changing the times at which you leave or arrive at places you frequent regularly
- You should always be alert when you are on the move. Observe what is happening all around you. Be suspicious of any vehicle that is following you, particularly if you have previously noticed it near your home, place of work or during other journeys
- Get into the habit of continually monitoring the surroundings of your home or places of work to detect the presence of suspicious-looking persons or vehicles. Do the same before getting into a car
- Avoid going through places that are dark, uninhabited or inhospitable. "It is better to arrive late than never"
- Do not give details of your itinerary. Handle it with caution and as far as possible avoid including any information on times and routes to be taken
- Avoid frequenting establishments at night but if you must, maximize your security
- Keep a register of persons and visitors entering your premises
- Make all staff working with you aware of all the security measures
- Install a direct line of communication with the authorities
- Do not accept packages, flowers, gifts or parcels that are not properly identified. If you have any doubt, the rule is: do not open them, put them outside the residence in an open and remote area and immediately call the police.

Recommendations

Diplomats should be made aware that their position alone makes them a target, so they must always follow their security team's instructions to the letter in order to avoid being threatened. If an attack should occur, it will have less of an impact as a result of the existence of security assessments by police intelligence.

It must be stressed that the situation will vary for each diplomat, depending on their mission and the circumstances in which they are carrying it out. Do not forget that security plans, while they may be similar, are never identical.

24. **Finland** (15 May 2012) expressed the following views:

Finland ... wishes to emphasize the importance of cooperation on security matters not only at the international level, but also at the national level between the missions and the competent local authorities.

25. **Jordan** (1 March 2011), **the United Arab Emirates** (16 March 2011), **Iraq** (5 April 2011), **Panama** (29 April 2011), **Belgium** (20 June 2011), **Burkina Faso** (28 October 2011), **the Islamic Republic of Iran** (30 November 2011), **Slovenia** (9 May 2012) and **Finland** (15 May 2012) reported on the measures taken to enhance the protection, security and safety of diplomatic and consular missions and representatives as well as missions and representatives with diplomatic status to international intergovernmental organizations on their respective territories.[4]

IV. Status of participation in international conventions pertaining to the protection, security and safety of diplomatic and consular missions and representatives as at 11 June 2012

26. Each instrument listed below is represented in tables 1 and 2 by the letter shown on the left in the list.

A. Vienna Convention on Diplomatic Relations of 1961 (signed at Vienna on 18 April 1961; entered into force on 24 April 1964, in accordance with article 51);

B. Optional Protocol to the Vienna Convention on Diplomatic Relations concerning Acquisition of Nationality of 1961 (signed at Vienna on 18 April 1961; entered into force on 24 April 1964, in accordance with article VI);

C. Optional Protocol to the Vienna Convention on Diplomatic Relations concerning the Compulsory Settlement of Disputes of 1961 (signed at Vienna on 18 April 1961; entered into force on 24 April 1964);

D. Vienna Convention on Consular Relations of 1963 (signed at Vienna on 24 April 1963; entered into force on 19 March 1967, in accordance with article 77);

E. Optional Protocol to the Vienna Convention on Consular Relations concerning Acquisition of Nationality of 1963 (signed at Vienna on 24 April 1963; entered into force on 19 March 1967);

F. Optional Protocol to the Vienna Convention on Consular Relations concerning the Compulsory Settlement of Disputes of 1963 (signed at Vienna on 24 April 1963; entered into force on 19 March 1967);

G. Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of Crimes against Internationally Protected Persons, including Diplomatic Agents, of 1973 (adopted by the General Assembly of the United Nations on 14 December 1973; entered into force on 20 February 1977).

[4] For the relevant parts of the reports, see the website of the Sixth Committee of the General Assembly (www.un.org/ga/sixth): sixty-seventh session; "Consideration of effective measures to enhance the protection, security and safety of diplomatic and consular missions and representatives"; full texts of the replies.

Table 1
Total participation in international conventions pertaining to the protection, security and safety of diplomatic and consular missions and representatives

Signature, succession to signature						
A	B	C	D	E	F	G
60	18	29	48	19	38	25

Ratification, accession or succession						
A	B	C	D	E	F	G
187	51	67	173	39	49	173

Table 2
Status of participation in international conventions pertaining to the protection, security and safety of diplomatic and consular missions and representatives

	Signature, succession to signature							*Ratification, accession or succession*						
State	*A*	*B*	*C*	*D*	*E*	*F*	*G*	*A*	*B*	*C*	*D*	*E*	*F*	*G*
Afghanistan								A						G
Albania	A							A			D			G
Algeria								A			D			G
Andorra								A			D			G
Angola								A			D			
Antigua and Barbuda											D			G
Argentina	A	B		D		F		A	B		D			G
Armenia								A			D			G
Australia	A			D			G	A		C	D		F	G
Austria	A		C	D		F		A		C	D		F	G
Azerbaijan								A			D			G
Bahamas								A		C	D			G
Bahrain								A			D			G
Bangladesh								A			D			G
Barbados								A			D			G
Belarus	A						G	A			D			G
Belgium	A		C	D		F		A	B	C	D	E	F	G
Belize								A			D			G
Benin				D		F		A			D			G
Bhutan								A			D			G
Bolivia (Plurinational State of)				D				A			D			G
Bosnia and Herzegovina					E	F		A	B	C	D			G
Botswana								A	B	C	D	E	F	G

State	Signature, succession to signature							Ratification, accession or succession						
	A	*B*	*C*	*D*	*E*	*F*	*G*	*A*	*B*	*C*	*D*	*E*	*F*	*G*
Brazil	A			D	E			A			D			G
Brunei Darussalam														G
Bulgaria	A						G	A		C	D	E	F	G
Burkina Faso				D		F		A			D		F	G
Burundi								A						G
Cambodia								A	B	C	D			G
Cameroon				D	E	F		A			D			G
Canada	A						G	A			D			G
Cape Verde								A			D			G
Central African Republic	A	B	C	D		F		A	B	C				G
Chad								A						
Chile	A			D		F		A			D			G
China								A			D			G
Colombia	A		C	D	E	F		A			D			G
Comoros								A						G
Congo				D	E	F		A						
Cook Islands														
Costa Rica	A			D				A		C	D			G
Côte d'Ivoire				D		F		A						G
Croatia								A			D			G
Cuba	A			D				A			D			G
Cyprus								A			D			G
Czech Republic								A			D			G
Democratic People's Republic of Korea								A			D			G
Democratic Republic of the Congo	A			D	E	F		A	B	C	D			G
Denmark	A	B	C	D	E	F	G	A	B	C	D	E	F	G
Djibouti								A			D			G
Dominica								A		C	D			G
Dominican Republic	A	B	C	D	E	F		A	B	C	D	E	F	G
Ecuador	A		C	D			G	A		C	D			G
Egypt								A	B		D	E		G
El Salvador								A			D			G
Equatorial Guinea								A			D			G
Eritrea								A			D			
Estonia								A	B	C	D	E	F	G
Ethiopia								A						G
Fiji								A		C	D			G

State	*Signature, succession to signature*							*Ratification, accession or succession*						
	A	*B*	*C*	*D*	*E*	*F*	*G*	*A*	*B*	*C*	*D*	*E*	*F*	*G*
Finland	A	B	C	D	E	F	G	A	B	C	D	E	F	G
France	A		C	D		F		A		C	D		F	G
Gabon				D		F		A	B	C	D	E	F	G
Gambia														
Georgia								A			D			G
Germany	A	B	C	D	E	F	G	A	B	C	D	E	F	G
Ghana	A	B	C	D	E	F		A			D	E		G
Greece	A							A			D			G
Grenada								A			D			G
Guatemala	A						G	A			D			G
Guinea								A	B	C	D			G
Guinea-Bissau								A						G
Guyana								A			D			G
Haiti								A			D			G
Holy See	A			D				A			D			
Honduras								A			D			G
Hungary	A						G	A		C	D		F	G
Iceland							G	A	B	C	D	E	F	G
India								A	B	C	D	E	F	G
Indonesia								A	B		D	E		
Iran (Islamic Republic of)	A	B	C	D				A	B	C	D	E	F	G
Iraq	A	B	C					A	B	C	D	E		G
Ireland	A		C	D		F		A			D			G
Israel	A		C	D				A						G
Italy	A	B	C	D	E	F	G	A	B	C	D	E	F	G
Jamaica								A			D			G
Japan	A		C					A		C	D		F	G
Jordan								A			D			G
Kazakhstan								A			D			G
Kenya								A	B	C	D	E	F	G
Kiribati								A			D			G
Kuwait				D	E	F		A		C	D			G
Kyrgyzstan								A			D			G
Lao People's Democratic Republic								A	B	C	D	E	F	G
Latvia								A			D			G
Lebanon	A	B	C	D		F		A			D			G
Lesotho								A			D			G
Liberia	A			D	E	F		A	B	C	D			G

State	Signature, succession to signature							Ratification, accession or succession						
	A	*B*	*C*	*D*	*E*	*F*	*G*	*A*	*B*	*C*	*D*	*E*	*F*	*G*
Libya								A	B		D			G
Liechtenstein	A		C	D		F		A		C	D		F	G
Lithuania								A			D			G
Luxembourg	A		C	D		F		A		C	D		F	G
Madagascar								A	B	C	D	E	F	G
Malawi								A	B	C	D	E	F	G
Malaysia								A	B	C	D			G
Maldives								A			D			G
Mali								A			D			G
Malta								A		C	D			G
Marshall Islands								A			D			G
Mauritania								A			D			G
Mauritius								A		C	D		F	G
Mexico	A			D				A			D		F	G
Micronesia (Federated States of)								A			D			G
Monaco								A			D			G
Mongolia							G	A			D			G
Montenegro					E	F		A	B	C	D			G
Morocco								A	B		D	E		G
Mozambique								A			D			G
Myanmar								A	B		D			G
Namibia								A			D			
Nauru								A						G
Nepal								A	B	C	D	E	F	G
Netherlands								A	B	C	D	E	F	G
New Zealand	A		C					A	B	C	D	E	F	G
Nicaragua							G	A	B	C	D	E	F	G
Niger				D		F		A	B	C	D	E	F	G
Nigeria	A							A			D			
Niue														G
Norway	A	B	C	D	E	F	G	A	B	C	D	E	F	G
Oman								A	B	C	D	E	F	G
Pakistan	A							A		C	D		F	G
Palau														G
Panama	A			D	E	F		A	B	C	D	E	F	G
Papua New Guinea								A			D			G
Paraguay							G	A	B	C	D	E	F	G
Peru				D		F		A			D		F	G

State	Signature, succession to signature							Ratification, accession or succession						
	A	B	C	D	E	F	G	A	B	C	D	E	F	G
Philippines	A	B	C	D		F		A	B	C	D	E	F	G
Poland	A			D			G	A			D			G
Portugal								A			D			G
Qatar								A			D			G
Republic of Korea	A	B	C					A	B	C	D	E	F	G
Republic of Moldova								A			D			G
Romania	A						G	A		C	D		F	G
Russian Federation	A						G	A			D			G
Rwanda							G	A			D			G
Saint Kitts and Nevis								A			D			G
Saint Lucia								A			D			
Saint Vincent and the Grenadines								A			D			G
Samoa								A			D			
San Marino	A							A						
Sao Tome and Principe								A			D			G
Saudi Arabia								A			D			G
Senegal	A	B						A			D	E	F	G
Serbia					E	F		A	B	C	D			G
Seychelles								A		C	D		F	G
Sierra Leone								A						G
Singapore								A			D			G
Slovakia								A		C	D		F	G
Slovenia								A		C	D			G
Solomon Islands														
Somalia								A			D			
South Africa	A							A			D			G
South Sudan														
Spain								A		C	D		F	G
Sri Lanka	A							A	B	C	D			G
Sudan								A			D			G
Suriname								A	B	C	D	E	F	
Swaziland								A						G
Sweden	A	B	C	D	E	F	G	A	B	C	D	E	F	G
Switzerland	A		C	D		F		A	B	C	D	E	F	G
Syrian Arab Republic								A			D			G
Tajikistan								A			D			G
Thailand	A	B						A	B		D	E		G

State	Signature, succession to signature							Ratification, accession or succession						
	A	*B*	*C*	*D*	*E*	*F*	*G*	*A*	*B*	*C*	*D*	*E*	*F*	*G*
The former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia								A	B	C	D			G
Timor-Leste								A			D			
Togo								A			D			G
Tonga								A			D			G
Trinidad and Tobago								A			D			G
Tunisia							G	A	B		D	E		G
Turkey								A			D			G
Turkmenistan								A			D			G
Tuvalu								A			D			
Uganda								A						G
Ukraine	A						G	A			D			G
United Arab Emirates								A			D			G
United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland	A		C	D		F	G	A		C	D		F	G
United Republic of Tanzania	A	B	C					A	B	C	D			
United States of America	A		C	D			G	A		C	D			G
Uruguay	A			D		F		A			D			G
Uzbekistan								A			D			G
Vanuatu											D			
Venezuela (Bolivarian Republic of)	A			D				A			D			G
Viet Nam								A			D			G
Yemen								A			D			G
Zambia								A						
Zimbabwe								A			D			